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APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON
REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This Court accepted review ofthe Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Nathan Herren,

Docket No. 38783,2012 Opinion No. 59 (Idaho App., Nov. 9,2012), which reversed the district
court's order, on intermediate appeal, affirming Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction for
violation of a no contact order pursuant to 1. C. § 18-920 and affirming revocation of Mr.
Herren's withheld judgment.

B.

Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings
In the course of an ongoing dispute between Mr. Herren and his neighbor, William

McDermott, Mr. Herren:
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cut down a portion of McDermott's fence. Herren was charged with felony
malicious injury to property and, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to an
amended charge of misdemeanor malicious injury to property. The court entered a
withheld judgment and placed Herren on probation for two years. In addition, the
court entered a no contact order (NCO), providing, in relevant part, that Herren
could not "knowingly remain within 100 feet of' McDermott.
Opinion, p. 1-2.
As homeowners in the subdivision, both Mr. Herren and Mr. McDermott were members
of the homeowners association. Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12, In. 16-25; p. 123, In. 2-5. An annual
homeowners association meeting was scheduled in January 2009, the purpose of which was to
vote for new board members and address items such as the budget. Id. at p. 18, In. 11-19. Due
to Mr. Herren's ongoing issues with the homeowners association board, Mr. Herren wanted to
attend the meeting so that he could run for the board, present his side of issues and participate in
financial discussions. Id. at p. 99, In. 12-19; p. 121, In. 20-25; p. 122, In. 5-12; p. 142, In. 16-18;
p. 143, In. 5-7; p. 146, In. 6-9.
Mr. Herren thus filed a motion to modify the NCO to allow him to attend homeowners'
association meetings where Mr. McDermott, an association board member, would likely be
present. Opinion, p.2. However, ten days before the meeting, Mr. Herren received notice that
the annual meeting would be at the neighborhood elementary school instead of the neighborhood
clubhouse. Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 97, In. 17 - p. 98, In. 18; p. 99, In. 23-24; Exh. A. Mr. Herren's
son attends this elementary school and Mr. Herren believed the meeting would be held in the
gymnasium, which he knew was well over 100 feet in size. Id. at p. 97, In. 17 - p. 98, In. 18; p.
122, In. 18-23; p. 136, In 11 - p. 137, In. 7; p. 152, In. 1-7. Mr. Herren thus believed that he
could attend the meeting without violating the 100 foot restriction in the NCO in the event Mr.
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McDermott attended. Jd.
When Mr. Herren and his son arrived for the annual meeting, he went to the gym where
previous assemblies and programs had been held but discovered that the meeting was to be held in
the library. Jd. at p. 151, In. 18 - p. 152, In. 7. Mr. Herren and his son arrived in the library and
Mr. McDermott was not present. Jd. at p. 30, In. 17-20. Sometime thereafter, Mr. McDermott
arrived. Immediately upon noticing Mr. McDermott, Mr. Herren and his young son moved from
their seats in the middle of the room to the farthest back corner while Mr. McDermott sat with
board members at the front of the room. Jd. at p. 21, In. 15 - p. 22, In. 6; p. 43, In. 2-6; p. 52, In.
15 - p. 53, In. 4; p. 107, In. 7 - p. 108, In. 3. 1 Mr. Herren counted ceiling tiles, which he estimated
to be three feet in length, and estimated he was at least 100 feet away from the front of the room.
Jd. at p. 110, In. 19 - p. 111, In. 12.

Although Mr. McDermott did not perceive that Mr. Herren was causing a problem, the
two were at opposite ends of the room from one another and seventy to eighty people were present
at the homeowners association meeting Mr. McDermott phoned the police to complain that Mr.
Herren was violating the NCO. Jd. at p. 23, In. 4-18. p. 38, In. 11-15; p. 42, In. 24 - p. 43, In. 6; p.
67, In. 13-14. The officer went to the backdoor by which Mr. Herren was seated and Mr. Herren
went outside to speak with him. Jd. at p. 82, In. 17-19. Mr. Herren told the officer that he
believed he was more than 100 feet away. Jd. at p. 67, In. 19-20. The officer arrested Mr. Herren

1 In its brief on review, the State indicates that once Mr. McDermott came into the
meeting room, Mr. Herren "made eye contact with him, smiled, and moved to the back of the
room." p.3. However, whether there was eye contact was disputed as neither Mr. McDermott's
wife nor Mr. Herren recalled any eye contact. Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 61, In. 6-16; p. 107, In. 17-22.
Because the State did not argue to the magistrate that it should find Mr. Herren guilty based on
the brief eye contact, the magistrate never found whether Mr. Herren actually made eye contact
and smiled.
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and charged him with violating the NCO. Id. at p. 73, In. 3-21.
Following a court trial on March 10,2009, the magistrate found that Mr. Herren violated
I.C. § 18-920 because he knowingly remained within 100 feet ofMr. McDermott at the
homeowners association annual meeting. Id. at p. 174, In. 23 - p. 175, In. 3. On April 7, 2009,
the state accused Mr. Herren of violating his probation in the 2007 case by committing the new
crime of violating I.C. § 18-920. R. 93-94. On April 19, 2010, Mr. Herren admitted violating the
conditions of his probation in the injury to property case by being found guilty of committing the
new crime alleged in the NCO case. Mag. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 3, In. 19 - p. 4, In. 4.

Mr. Herren appealed to the district court challenging both his judgment of conviction for
violation of the NCO and the probation violation. R. 149-51; 491-93. The district court granted
Mr. Herren's request to consolidate the two cases on appeal. R. 163,505. The district court
affirmed Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction and the fmding that he violated his probation. R.
247-54,588-596. Mr. Herren further appealed to this Court and the case was assigned to the Court
of Appeals.
In a published opinion, Judge Gutierrezjoined by Judge Melanson held that "by its plain
language, section 18-920(2) only criminalizes violations of an NCO where the violation was
contact in the form of physical touching and/or communicating." Opinion, p. 6. The Court
explained that although it was possible the Legislature did not:
consciously [intend] to exclude the activity at issue in this case, that is exactly what
it did by its choice of language, and we are constrained by adherence to our rules of
statutory construction to give effect to the plain language of the statute. Indeed,
there is an argument that had the Legislature intended the interpretation urged by
the State, it would have stated in the statute that any violation of an NCO could
form the basis of the offense, as opposed to explicitly requiring "contact" in
violation of an NCO. See, e.g., I.C. § 18-7905 (defining first degree stalking as,
4·
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inter alia, a violation ofIdaho Code § 18-7906 and where the "actions constituting
the offense are in violation of a temporary restraining order, protection order, no
contact order or injunction, or any combination thereof').
Jd. atp. 7.

The Court of Appeals noted that it was undisputed that Mr. Herren's conviction rested on
his knowingly remaining within Mr. McDermott's presence and such conduct does not necessarily
involve contact. Jd. Thus, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the conviction
and that the district court's decision affirming the conviction must be reversed. !d. Because the
magistrate's finding that Mr. Herren violated probation was premised upon this conviction, the
Court concluded that the order revoking Mr. Herren's withheld judgment must also be reversed.
Jd. Judge Gratton dissented, opining that the "term 'contact' is, by virtue of the statutory language

in I.C. § 18-920 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2, defined as that which is set out in the no contact
order itself." Jd. at p. 8.
The State timely petitioned for review, which this Court accepted.
ARGUMENT
Longstanding Principles of Statutory Construction Compel the Conclusion That
Section 18-920 Requires Contact Within the Ordinary Meaning of the Word in
Order to Establish a Criminal Violation of the NCO and This Court Must Therefore
Vacate Mr. Herren's Judgment of Conviction Because the Magistrate Rested its
Finding of Guilt on Mr. Herren's Conduct in Remaining Within 100 Feet of Mr.
McDermott
The legislature specifically defined the offense of "violation of a no contact order" as
being committed when a person has contact with the stated person in violation of the no contact
order. I.C. § 18-920(2)(c). According to the State, "the no contact order itself defines the
prohibited contact and any violation of the terms of a no contact order is sufficient to charge a
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crime under I.C. § 18-920(2). Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review
("Respondent's Brief') p. 9-10. To accept this interpretation, this Court would be required to set
aside several well-established principles of statutory construction, including (l) that absent a
specific legislative definition, courts must give the words of a statute their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning and (2) that statutes must be read to give effect to every word, clause and
sentence and that courts must not construe a statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of its
provisions.
Section 18-920 plainly makes it a crime for a person to have "contact with the stated
person in violation of an order." Because the legislature elected not to define "contact" for
purposes of the NCO statute, that word must be given its ordinary meaning. Further, the State did
not argue and the magistrate did not find that Mr. Herren had contact with Mr. McDermott.
Instead, the magistrate rested its finding of guilty entirely on the conclusion Mr. Herren knowingly
remained with 100 feet of Mr. McDermott. This Court should therefore reverse the district
court's order affirming Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction for violation of an NCO and
affirming revocation of his withheld judgment.
A.

Standard of Review
In reviewing an Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion, this Court gives serious consideration to

the views of the Court of Appeals while directly reviewing the decisions of the lower courts.
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,207,207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). On review of a decision ofthe

district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, this Court reviews the decision of the district
court directly. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008); State v.
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215,217 (Ct. App. 2008). This Court examines the
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magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those
findings. !d. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the
district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, this Court will affirm the district court's decision
as a matter of procedure. Id.
This Court exercises free review over questions of law. State v. 0 'Neill, 118 Idaho 244,
245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990). Statutory construction is a question oflaw. State v. Hickman, 146
Idaho 178, 184, 191 P.3d 1098, 1104 (2008); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689, 85 P.3d 656,
665 (2004). The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words ofthe statute; those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as
a whole. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893,265 P.3d 502,
506 (2011). Additionally, words of common usage must be given their usual, plain or ordinary
meaning. State v. Riley, 83 Idaho 346, 350, 362 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1961).
B.

Section 18-920 Requires Contact Within the Ordinary Meaning of the Word in
Order to Establish a Criminal Violation of the NCO
The crime of "violation of a no contact order is committed when" a person has been

"charged or convicted under" an enumerated offense, a NCO has been issued and the "person
charged or convicted has had contact with the stated person in violation of an order. I.C. §
18-920(2)(c). Thus, to prove a criminal violation of an NCO, the statute plainly requires the State
to prove: (1) there is a charge or conviction for an enumerated offense; (2) a NCO has been
issued; (3) the person contacted the protected person; and (4) the contact was in violation of the
NCO (as opposed to falling within an exception, such as permitted contact to participate in
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counseling or to respond to emergencies concerning shared children).
Had the legislature wished to criminalize any violation of the terms of a NCO, regardless
of whether it involved contact with the protected person, it could have simply provided that the
offense was committed when the person charged or convicted violates a term of the NCO.
Instead, the legislature limited which NCO violations constitute a new criminal offense to those
that involve contact with the protected person in violation of the NCO.
The State asserts that it is "untenable" to say that the term "contact" in I.C. § 18-920(2)(c)
does not draw meaning from the NCO and that to ignore the context in which the word "contact"
occurs disregards the rule requiring that the statute be construed as a whole. Respondent's Brief,
p. 10. However, to accept this position, it is necessary to eviscerate the word "contact" from the
statute and disregard the longstanding rules that statutory terms be given their ordinary meaning
unless otherwise defined and that each word in a statute be given effect and not treated as
surplusage. This Court should decline to adopt the State's strained interpretation of the statute
and instead apply its plain meaning by limiting criminal violations of an NCO to those violations
that involve "contact with the stated person" as the term "contact" is ordinarily construed.

1.

This Court should not treat the phrase "contact with the protected person" as
mere surplusage

It is well established that statutes must be read to give effect to every word, clause and

sentence and that courts must not construe a statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of its
provisions. See State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866,264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011); see also Bradbury
v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116,233 P.3d 38, 47 (2009) (courts will not construe a
statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of provisions included therein); Sweitzer v. Dean,
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118 Idaho 568, 571-72, 798 P.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (same); University o/Utah Hospital and

Medical Center v. Bethke, 101 Idaho 245, 611 P.2d 1030 (1980)(same). By asking this Court to
read the phrase "contact with the stated person" out of the statute, the State's interpretation stands
in direct contradiction to this rule.
The State's position is that "contact" is defined by the NCO and thus any conduct in
violation of the NCO is a new crime even ifit does not involve "contact with the stated person."
This position literally requires the Court to read the statute as if the word "contact" does not exist
and therefore a new crime is committed when any term of the NCO is violated regardless of
whether the conduct involved "contact." This reading ofthe statute is simply illogical- why
would the legislature insert the word "contact" when it really intended any NCO violation to be a
new crime? It would have been simple enough to define the offense as being committed when the
"person charged or convicted" violates the NCO, instead of specifYing "contact with the stated
person."
The State's interpretation that the legislature meant to criminalize all NCO violations
regardless of whether the violation involved contact with the stated person would require this
Court to treat the term "contact" as mere surplusage. Instead, this Court should apply the plain
meaning of the literal meaning of the words in the statute by concluding that it is a crime to have

contact with the stated person in violation of a no contact order.
2.

This Court should apply the common meaning of the word "contact"

It is well established that courts must construe statutory terms according to their plain,

obvious, and rational meanings. See e.g. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009)
(courts gives the words of a statute their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning); State v. Hart, 135
9·

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON REVIEW

Idaho 827, 829,25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001) (same); Nelson By and Through Nelson v. City of

Rupert, 128 Idaho 199,201,911 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1996) (courts must construe statutory tenns
according to their plain, obvious, and rational meanings); Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho
427,430, 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990) (ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when
construing a statute). The State fails to provide any authority to support its contrary argument that
the absence of statutory definition instead signifies that the word "contact" means whatever
conduct the presiding judge decides to prohibit in the NCO.
The dissent opined that the "plain meaning of a word is as commonly understood and
articulated within the context used, not some generic Webster's Dictionary definition." Opinion,
p. 10. However, re-defining "contact" as any NCO violation stands the ordinary meaning of the
tenn on its head. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, "contact" is not commonly re-defined as
any NCO violation in the NCO context. See Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 172, In. 1-1 0 (emphasis added)
(magistrate found that "the 100 feet [prohibition] prevents awkwardness even if no contact were

to occur at all.").
Further, a standard NCO could be violated in any number of ways without having "contact
with the stated person in violation of an order." For instance, NCOs commonly prohibit a person
from coming within a certain distance of the protected person's residence and workplace. See
States Exhibit 2 (fonn NCO). This provision could be violated if the defendant intentionally
waited until the protected person left the residence, entered it to retrieve belongings that had been
left behind prior to the NCO and left the premises before the protected person returned. The
provision could also be violated if the defendant went to the protected person's work knowing he
or she was on lunch break or absent to visit another employee. Each scenario involves a clear
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violation of the NCO's tenn prohibiting the defendant from coming with a certain distance of
protected places. Neither involves "contact with the stated person" under any sensible
construction of the phrase.
Nor is it illogical to limit new criminal offenses to those cases that involve contact in
violation of the NCO. As noted by the magistrate, there are sound reasons for distance
restrictions. However, entering the protected person's residence (which many times was also the
defendant's residence prior to the NCO) while the protected person is not home is not as serious
as purposely contacting the protected person, whether in person or otherwise. It makes sense to
have less serious violations of an NCO punishable by contempt or as a bailor probation violation
and only criminalizing more egregious violations of the NCO.
3.

Alaska's decision in Cooper

The State contends Mr. Herren and the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on Cooper v.
Cooper, 144 P.3d 451,457-58 (Alaska 2006) because the statute interpreted by Cooper differs
from Section 18-920. Respondent's Brief, p. 10. As has been previously explained, Mr. Herren
cites to Cooper because the Court utilized Webster's Third New International Dictionary
definition of "contact" as setting forth common usage of the tenn in construing protective orders.
Appellant's Reply, p. 2. Use of a dictionary definition to help define the ordinary meaning of a
word is not limited to Alaska. See e.g. Two Jinn, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. ofIns. , Idaho Supreme Court
Docket No. 38759, p. 5 (January 11,2013) (discussing plain dictionary definitions of statute's
words in construing its meaning); State v. Straub, 292 P.3d 273, _

(2013) (same); State v. Lee,

153 Idaho 559, 562, 286 P.3d 537, 540 (2012) (same); Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867, 264 P.3d 974
(same).
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The Cooper decision is pertinent to this case because it construed the ordinary meaning of
the word "contact" in the context of protection orders. The distinctions between the Alaska and
Idaho statute are irrelevant as to whether the ordinary meaning of "contact" should be applied
here.
4.

Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2 does not define the substantive offense of violation
ofa NCO

The State relies on the provisions ofI.C.R. 46(e) to support that the term "contact with the
stated person" really means violation of any NCO term. Respondent's Brief, p. 9. However, it is
the legislature's role to define substantive law such as crimes and not the courts. See In re SRBA
Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995). Under the state's proffered

interpretation, judges or rule committees are left to decide what might constitute a subsequent
criminal violation of a NCO depending on the conduct that is prohibited by the NCO. The
legislature curbed this authority by clarifYing that a criminal violation of a NCO only occurs when
a person "has contact" in violation of the order. It is also clear from the required language in the
no contact order itself, which includes an advisory that violation of the order may be prosecuted
under I.C. § 18-920, that it is the "contact" described in the order which is punishable under I.C. §
18-920.
It is the plain language of the statute, not the criminal rule, that defines the crime of

violating an NCO. Pursuant to the plain language of I.C. § 18-920, a person only commits the
offense set forth in that section by having contact with the stated perosn in violation ofthe no
contact order. I. C. § 18-920(2)(c).
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C.

No Substantial Evidence Supports a Conviction for Violating an NCO Because the
Magistrate Did Not Find That Mr. Herren Contacted Mr. McDermott and Based its
Finding of Guilt Entirely on its Conclusion That Mr. Herren Remained Within 100
Feet of Mr. McDermott
As found by the Court of Appeals:
it is undisputed the lower courts found Herren's act of knowingly remaining within
100 feet of McDermott was violative of the NCO. However, such an act does not
amount to physical touching andlor communicating (a point the State does not
contest) and, thus, cannot be considered "contact" pursuant to section 18-920(2).
Accordingly, we conclude the State failed to sustain its burden of proving each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no evidence
Herren had "contact" with McDermott in violation of the NCO as required by the
plain language of the statute.

Opinion, p. 7.
In its brief on Review, the State notes there was testimony that when Mr. McDermott
entered the room, Mr. Herren smiled at him and made eye contact. Respondent's Brief, p. 3.
Although it does not specifically argue to this Court that this conduct was "contact," it did so
argue to the district court. See R. 563-64. It is thus worth noting that the alleged eye contact
cannot support Mr. Herren's conviction under the correct interpretation of the statute. Initially,
during trial, the State did not argue that Mr. Herren's brief eye contact violated the no contact
order and, on the contrary, argued to the magistrate that if Mr. Herren had left the meeting after
making eye contact with Mr. McDermott "we wouldn't even be in this situation." Tr. (CR-MD2009-1176) p. 166, In. 20-21. As the State acknowledged, predicating a criminal violation ofLC.
§ 18-920 on the type of brief eye contact that occurred here, which was nothing more than
recognizing one another's presence - does not constitute a criminal violation of a no contact
order:
It's kind oflike somebody who - a no-contact order is in place and they go to the
13 • APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON REVIEW

grocery store ... and if they see the protected party in the grocery store ... a public
place, something that's open to the public, and they make eye contact or they see
the protected party and if that person then leaves the store, we're not going to be in
a situation where a violation of a no-contact order is about because that person
does not knowingly remain in the presence of the protected party.
Tr. Mag. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 166, In. 21 - 167, In. 7. Similarly, the magistrate based its finding of guilt
on the finding that Mr. Herren knowingly remained within 100 feet and did not find him guilty for
his brief eye contact with Mr. McDermott before moving to th~ back of the room. ld. at p. 172,
In. 11 - 174, In. 24.
The state did not argue and the magistrate did not find that Mr. Herren violated I.e. § 18920 by having brief eye contact with Mr. McDermott. Accordingly, even if such eye contact
could be construed as "contact" within the ordinary meaning of the term, Mr. Herren's judgment
of conviction cannot be sustained on that basis.
Further, brief eye contact such as may have occurred here is not "contact" within the
common meaning of the term. In common usage, "contacting" means physically touching or
communicating. See Cooper, 144 P.3d at 457-58 (Alaska 2006) (utilizing Webster's Third New
International Dictionary definition of "contact" as setting forth common usage of the term in
construing protective orders). Indeed, the problems with construing such brief eye contact as
constituting contact for purposes of I.e. § 18-920 is well illustrated by the prosecutor's comments
during closing argument cited above. The problems with enforcing and complying with such an
order would be insurmountable.
This is not to say that knowingly remaining within one hundred feet or eye contact and
facial expressions could never support a conviction under I.e. § 18-920. For instance,
intentionally placing oneself within the distance restriction combined with prolonged eye contact,
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facial expressions or other non verbal communication could be reasonably construed as contact as
the word is normally understood. In some cases, such as a direct text message or addressing the
person face to face, the contact requirement has clearly been met. In other cases, whether a
defendant has had contact with the protected person in violation of the order will be a closer call.
In such cases, juries are well-equipped to consider the ordinary meaning of "contact" and to
determine whether a crime has been committed.
The magistrate neither found, nor was there substantial evidence to demonstrate, that Mr.
Herren contacted Mr. McDermott within the ordinary meaning of that term. The magistrate
instead found that Mr. Herren violated the NCO by knowingly remaining within 100 feet of Mr.
McDermott. Although arguably a violation of the NCO's terms, knowingly remaining within 100
feet of another is not a violation of the NCO by having contact and therefore is not a criminal
violation of I.e. § 18-920. Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction must therefore be vacated.

D.

Because the Conviction in the 2009 Case is Unlawful, the Magistrate's Order Finding
That Mr. Herren Violated His Probation and Revoking His Withheld Judgment
Must be Vacated
A court may not revoke probation without a finding that the probationer violated the terms

of probation. State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (2007); State v. Blake, 133
Idaho 237, 243, 985 P.2d 117, 123 (1999); see also I.C. §§ 19-2603,20-222. In probation
violation proceedings, the State bears the burden of providing satisfactory proof of a violation and
the court's finding of a probation violation must be on verified facts. Rose, 144 Idaho at 765, 171
P.3d at 256.
Here, the magistrate's finding that Mr. Herren violated his probation was based solely on
his admission to being found guilty of violating I.C. § 18-920. As set forth above, that finding of

15 • APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON REVIEW

guilt and the resulting conviction must be vacated. It therefore follows that the magistrate's order
finding that Mr. Herren violated his probation, therefore revoking its order withholding judgment
must similarly be vacated.
CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above and in Mr. Herren's briefing before the Court of Appeals,
this Court should reverse the district court's order on intermediate appeal affirming Mr. Herren's
judgment of conviction for violation of a no contact order pursuant to I.C. § 18-920 and affirming
revocation ofMr. Herren's withheld judgment.
DATED this

t~y of February, 2013.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

~~~g 9:--'1~~
Robyn Fyffe
\
Attorneys for Nathan Wade Herren
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